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8.1  Pensions as a Labor Compensation Instrument 
Although pensions are an undeniably important component of most 
workers’ compensation packages, whether or not their role is unique is 
more problematic. In terms of  the structure of compensation, pensions 
have the following effects. By shifting compensation from one’s working 
years to the period of retirement, they tilt the life-cycle earnings path up- 
ward. During the initial periods of employment, workers typically make 
contributions to the pension but acquire no earned rights to the benefits, 
thus effectively reducing their wage rate and imposing a transactions cost 
on job changes. As their  experience increases, these contributions are 
coupled with at least partial earned benefit rights. 
The extent to which market processes will lead to the use of nontrans- 
ferable pension benefits is greater than might be concluded from current 
pension plan characteristics since the 1974 Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) imposes minimal vesting requirements. Before the 
advent of ERISA, the majority of workers (70% from 1950 to 1970) who 
left their jobs for voluntary or involuntary reasons forfeited their pension 
benefits (see U.S. Senate 1971). 
ERISA now requires full pension vesting after 10 years of service, but 
for the high-turnover group of inexperienced workers a primary implica- 
tion  of  pensions is  that they impose a fixed cost on job changes. The 
ERISA requirements have led to “cliff vesting” for almost three-fourths 
of  all  workers  covered  by  private  pensions.  I  Under  these  provisions, 
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workers with fewer than 10 years of experience forfeit all pension benefits 
if they leave the firm. These fixed costs will reduce worker turnover, an ef- 
fect that has strong empirical support.* 
The economic rationale for this transactions cost component of  com- 
pensation  has been discussed in a number of  contexts. The forfeitable 
portion of the pension benefits can be viewed as the worker’s compensa- 
tion to the employer for its training investment in the worker.’ Such a role 
for pensions has been formalized for both models of  external job search 
(Mortenson 1978) and models of on-the-job experimentation by workers 
and  firm^.^ Pensions further reduce turnover costs in that they serve as a 
self-selection device by attracting more stable employees to the firm (Vis- 
cusi 1980). Finally, pensions can also induce efficient turnover in situa- 
tions in which there is the potential for worker ~hirking.~ 
These constructive functions are by no means unique to pensions. Other 
forms of upward tilting in the temporal wage structure can produce simi- 
lar effects. If, however, it is difficult to vary wages on a period-by-period 
basis, pensions can increase the flexibility of the compensation system. 
Firms may attempt to link wages on the job to job-specific experience to 
provide a sense of equity for all those working at the position. Pensions 
permit firms to make a link between wages and total periods worked at the 
firm, as well as to past job performance (as reflected in past wages). If 
there is  an enterprise-specific component to worker productivity or the 
firm’s hiring and training investment (or in stochastic models to the infor- 
mation workers possess), it will be desirable to have such wage flexibility. 
Even apart from such wage structure rigidities, pensions may be a more 
attractive compensation mechanism for promoting the aforementioned 
labor market  functions. In addition to their very favorable tax status, 
pensions can be distinguished from a simple wage payment in that they 
serve to promote savings for old age and insurance against postretirement 
declines in income. By  avoiding problems of adverse selection through 
mandatory pension coverage, reducing the fixed costs associated with an- 
nuity purchases, and promoting forced savings,6 pensions may offer ad- 
vantages that individually purchased  annuities  do not  offer.  There is, 
however, a trade-off since provision for increased resources in one’s post- 
retirement years reduces one’s preretirement  income, which might also 
have served an insurance function to the extent that it promoted stability 
in the preretirement earnings path. 
In this paper I will not be concerned with such factors that might give 
pensions a unique role to play, but rather I will address the role of pen- 
sions as a form of deferred compensation that is contingent on remaining 
at the firm. The transferable pension benefit rights do not affect mobility 
decisions and will not be the focus of my analysis. 
The two mobility-related functions of pensions to be considered are in- 
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duce labor turnover by leading more stable employees to self-select into 
the firm. Second, once at the firm, workers’ incentive to switch employers 
will be reduced by the transactions cost aspect of pension benefits. 
This reduced  mobility represents a beneficial labor market  function 
from the standpoint of hiring and training costs, but if a worker is trapped 
in a job he would like to leave the implications may be quite different, par- 
ticularly if he did not have accurate perceptions of all of the uncertainties 
he faced. These effects are reminiscent of the types of concerns that led to 
the passage of ERISA. The principal issue to be considered here is whether 
this immobility is optimal and, if so, when. 
Uncertainty plays a critical role in this analysis, both in terms of provid- 
ing workers an incentive to change jobs and through its effect on the wel- 
fare implications of  nontransferable pensions. Because of the long lags 
before individuals acquire full benefit rights, the nature of the uncertain- 
ties may be quite different from that in the standard one-period compen- 
sating wage differential model in which workers encounter a single lottery. 
Learning is likely to play an important role, as will the possibility that in- 
dividuals may face a sequence of interrelated risks over time. 
Section 8.2 of  the paper begins with a relatively conventional compen- 
sating differential model, and sections 8.3 and 8.4 consider learning and 
other structures of uncertainty. Although pensions have no essential role 
to play in a single-period lottery model, once the uncertainty assumes a 
dynamic character they do serve an important mobility-reducing func- 
tion. 
8.2  The Optimal Wage Structure under Uncertainty: 
The Standard Case 
The most prevalent uncertainty assumption, which is the foundation of 
the classic compensating differential analysis, is that the worker faces lot- 
teries that are independent and identically distributed over time. In the 
case of  job risks, there is assumed to be an invariant stochastic process 
governing the chance that a worker will be injured. If the worker has a res- 
ervation wage w0  and the prospective alternative job poses a chance p of 
suffering a loss -  8 in each period and a probability 1 -  p of no loss, to 
attract the worker to this uncertain job the employer must offer a wage WI 
equal to wo  + p0 in each period.’ This wage will not only attract the worker 
initially, it will  always keep him at the firm if  there are no time-related 
changes in his employment choice problem. 
Instead of offering a uniform wage rate, the firm could offer wages on a 
period-by-period basis. Any upward tilting of the wage structure that of- 
fers the same present value as the compensating differential wage package 
will suffice. Downward tilting with the same present value will attract the 
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ing the loss PO in each period) drops below WO.  The firm will not only incur 
mobility-related costs in this instance, its wage bill per period of  employ- 
ment will rise as well. 
One form of upward tilting in the wage structure is the use of pensions. 
I will treat pensions as giving the worker a payment of z during his final 
year of employment, where z represents the discounted present value of 
his annuity. To the extent workers acquire at least a partial earned right to 
pensions during the earlier part of their careers, some of this value may be 
spread over a larger number of periods. 
Although making the number of  periods to the worker’s choice prob- 
lem arbitrarily large poses no conceptual problem, it is simplest to focus 
on the two-period case.* The worker selects his job based on its expected 
present value. Let rdenote the worker’s discount rate, which is the inverse 
of one plus the interest rate. The implicit assumption is that workers are 
free to borrow and lend at this rate. Workers would, for example, be in- 
different to receiving their entire lifetime income through a pension or 
having this income spread more evenly over their lifetime. A principal rea- 
son we do not observe extreme outcomes such as this is that individuals’ 
discretion over their work effort creates an adverse incentives problem 
when making loans based on anticipated lifetime income. 
Any acceptable wage package consisting of a base wage wand a pension 
z must compensate the worker for the loss 8 in each period and for the op- 
portunity cost wo  of employment, so that the compensation package must 
satisfy 
(1)  (wo +PO)  i  p’  = W(i  p’) + Pz. 
r=O  r=O 
Any positive value of z will lead to tilting in the wage structure, as com- 
pared with the flat wage case. The maximum tilting occurs when the worker 
takes all of his wage in the form of pension payments or he sets w  equal to 
zero. 
A final possible wage structure is ex post compensation for the adverse 
job outcome. The firm can attract workers by offering a base wage wo and 
paying an additional premium of O to each worker who suffers an adverse 
outcome. This approach will have the same cost to the employer as the 
pension and flat wage. The informational requirements for ex post com- 
pensation are, however, much greater since the firm must be able to  moni- 
tor the adverse outcome. Although this task is not difficult for readily 
visible job injuries, for other job attributes such as those relating to job 
satisfaction it is not as straightforward. If a worker will be paid a bonus if 
he dislikes a co-worker or if he finds his job strenuous or boring, there will 
be an obvious incentive to misrepresent the job’s attracti~eness.~ 
The principal advantage of ex post compensation is that it eliminates 
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be WO.  This stabilization both across and within periods irrespective of the 
lottery outcome will be attractive if workers are risk averse. Under a flat 
wage policy there will be a possible within-period wage gap of 0. The pen- 
sion package leads to a comparable within-period spread but a lower base 
wage. If the insurance value of the pension is not taken into account, so 
that z is treated as comparable to a bonus in the final period of work, risk- 
averse workers will value pay packages with pensions less than a flat wage, 
with ex post compensation valued highest. 
8.2.1  Heterogeneous Workers 
There will also be differences in the attractiveness of the wage structure 
arising from variations in individuals’ probability assessments.  lo Suppose 
that a fractionfof the potential work force assesses the probability of in- 
curring a loss 0 in each period asp^, while a fraction 1 -  fassess this prob- 
ability as p, wherep^ < p.  This heterogeneity will lead the wage structures 
to have different relative costs and different welfare implications, depend- 
ing on the source of the heterogeneity. 
Consider first the situation in which these probability assessments de- 
rive from actual differences in the lotteries. Some workers may be more 
accident prone or more likely to be productive. The wage costs to the em- 
ployer will be least if the employer can design the wage structure to screen 
out the high-risk workers and to attract onlylow-risk workers. With a uni- 
form wage over time of wo  + p^0, the flat wage structure will serve as a per- 
fect self-selection device as workers with assessed failure probabilities p 
will not find the job attractive. Pensions serve an identical self-selection 
function and will impose the same discounted expected cost, where the 
form of the pension continues to satisfy equation (1) (after replacingp by 
6).  Ex post compensation will not screen out any high-risk workers, as the 
per period wage bill per worker will be wo  + fi  + (1 -  flp. Workers will 
be allocated inefficiently, and the firm’s wage bill will be higher than for 
the other wage structures. 
If  the differences in probability assessment arise from misassessments 
of the risk, the relative costs to the employer remain the same, but the effi- 
ciency implications are altered. For concreteness, suppose that p is the 
true probability of failure for all workers but that a fractionfunderesti- 
mate this p to be p^.  The value of p will be assumed to be constant over 
time, or there is assumed to  be no learning. For workers who misassess the 
risk, the actual expected utility of the uncertain job under either the flat 
wage or pensions will be [wo  +  -  p)0]  p’, which is below the value of 
the alternative job; individuals who correctly assess the probability will be 
screened out. Ex post compensation prevents any such welfare losses and 
will attract a broad mix of workers. The wage costs will, however, be high- 
1 
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er (i.e., w0 + p0 per period, as before) so that there is no incentive for em- 
ployers to utilize this wage mechanism. 
If all workers systematically overestimate the risk, employers can limit 
their wage costs to wo + p0 by offering ex post compensation. Through 
judicious choice of the wage structure, the employer can always limit the 
per period employment costs to w0 + PO. If some workers have a lower 
risk assessment, the wage costs can be lowered further through  a self- 
selecting wage mechanism.  Biased  assessments consequently can never 
hurt the employer, but they can enable him to make money from system- 
atic underassessments of the risk. 
Under a situation of time- invariant lotteries, pensions have no essential 
role to play. Flat wages, pensions, and all intermediate  forms of wage 
structure tilting impose the same wage costs, provide workers with the 
same level of welfare, and have the same self-selection properties. (There 
are, however, some differences for risk-averse workers involving a trade- 
off  between expected utility before and after retirement if  money is not 
transferable across periods on an actuarially fair basis.) Ex post compen- 
sation protects misinformed workers from welfare losses but sacrifices the 
self-selection properties of the other wage structures. Moreover, it is never 
in the employer’s financial interest to utilize this mechanism when there is 
any heterogeneity in risk perceptions except in the bias case in which all 
workers overestimate the risk. 
8.3  Lotteries with Worker Learning 
8.3.1  Problem Structure 
A variant on the standard lottery structure is to introduce the potential 
for worker learning. When workers do not possess perfect information 
regarding the job lotteries they face, it will be desirable to revise these per- 
ceptions as additional information is acquired. In the earlier mispercep- 
tion discussion, for example, it was perhaps unrealistic to assume that 
workers who underestimate the job risks would never revise these judg- 
ments in the face of repeated lottery outcomes. In the case of income un- 
certainties, there are a variety of sources of information that can be used 
to form these judgments. The ease of the job, the performance of one’s 
co-workers, the reactions of the boss, and one’s current productivity can 
all contribute to these assessments. Uncertainty regarding nonmonetary 
rewards can be treated similarly. 
For concreteness, I will continue to assume that a loss of  O is generated 
by an underlying stochastic process that is independent and identically 
distributed over time. The difference is that the worker does not know the 
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has a prior assessment p of the chance of an adverse outcome but that he 
updates this prior in Bayesian fashion based on his on-the-job experi- 
ences. I will denote by q the true probability that I9 will prevail, which is as- 
sumed to be known to the employer. I will often assume that the prior be 
characterized by a beta distribution, so that the posterior probability p/ 
p(m, n)  of  I9  after observing rn unsuccessful outcomes and n successful 
outcomes is 
"IP + m  P(rn, n)  =  + rn +  7 
where y  represents the precision of the prior. 
To investigate the role of pensions, it is instructive to focus on the two- 
period  case."  The principal  implications  of  the  model  will  hinge  on 
whether or not there is any chance that the worker may find it desirable to 
leave his job, which are principles with broad applicability. Two situations 
may occur. Either the worker chooses to leave the uncertain job after an 
unsuccessful outcome or he remains with it. A third possibility, that the 
worker may depart after a successful job experience, can be ruled out if 
the life-cycle wage structure is not downward sloping." 
The choice for the firm will be whether or not it chooses to retain the 
worker following an unfavorable outcome. Let Wa  represent the per peri- 
od wage costs if the worker is always induced to remain with the firm, and 
let wb  represent the per period wage costs if the worker leaves after an  un- 
successful outcome. For the wage structures considered below, Wa>  wb, 
or it is always more expensive to retain the worker irrespective of the job 
outcome. Let h represent the hiring and training costs per worker. 
In a two-period model, the discounted period of employment is 1 + p if 
the worker never leaves the job and 1 + p(1 -  q)  if there is a chance q of 
an unfavorable first-period outcome that will lead him to quit. It will be 
desirable to keep the worker irrespective of the job outcome if the per pe- 
riod employment costs are lower, or 
which reduces to the requirement 
If the turnover costs are sufficiently large, it will be desirable to always 
keep the worker. Rather than analyze the implications of  turnover costs 
for each wage structure, I will focus on the wage mechanisms that yield 
the lowest values of W, and wb. One could then employ equation (2) to  as- 
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8.3.2  Wage Structures That Prevent Turnover 
To ensure that workers never leave the uncertain job, the wage in period 
2 must be sufficiently large to retain them after an adverse job experience 
in period 1. Since the worker’s maximum expected loss in period 2 will be 
p(  1  ,  O)O, the flat wage will have an associated discounted cost C,  equal to 
C’  = [wo  + p(1, O)O](l  + 0). Unlike the results for time-invariant lotter- 
ies, the flat wage clearly can never be optimal from the firm’s standpoint 
since workers are being overpaid in period 1 when their expected loss isp6. 
Since no flat wage below wo  + p(  1,O)O can retain workers in period 2,  this 
wage structure is necessarily dominated by other, more flexible alterna- 
tives. 
Ex post compensation will cost the employer wo  + q0 in each period, 
where q is the employer’s assessed probability of an adverse outcome. If 
the employer and worker assessments are identical and q equalsp, the dis- 
counted cost C,of  this form of compensation will be C, = (wo  + qO)(l + 
0) = (WO  + pQ(1 + 0). It is noteworthy that C,is  independent of all char- 
acteristics of the worker’s probability assessments except the value of his 
prior probability of an adverse outcome. The precision  does not enter. 
This property is  true more generally  in situations possessing this two- 
armed bandit structure whenever there is no chance of  leaving the uncer- 
tain job. 
The final alternative is to vary wages on a period-by-period basis or, 
equivalently, to offer the worker a pension z in the second period if he re- 
mains with the job. The minimal tilting of the wage structure that will al- 
ways keep the worker on the job occurs when 
or 
z = w0  -  w + p(i,  o)e. 
One must then ascertain the minimal base wage, which will satisfy the 
following condition: 
w -  pe + pp[w + z -  p(i, o)e] 
+ p(1 -  ~)[wo  + z -  ~(0,  1)6] = wo  + PWO, 
or 
(4)  w + P(W + Z) = w0(i + P) + pe + op[p(i, ole1 
+ P(1 -  PlP(0,1)8 = (Wo + PW1 + 0). 
The expression on the left-hand side of equation (4) is the discounted wage 
cost C, to the firm of the pension, which is equal to C, above. Imposing 
the requirement in equation (3) on w + z, one can calculate the wage 
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and 
The value of z represents the minimal upward tilting of the wage structure 
that will induce the worker to remain on the job. The minimal tilting re- 
quired decreases with the precision of the prior since 6p(l,  0)/6y  < 0. 
Alternatively,  since the firm can always postpone wage payment arbi- 
trarily so long as the discounted value to the worker is unchanged, it can 
give the worker all of his compensation in terms of a pension. I will denote 
this upper limit on pension payments that impose the same cost as the 
wage structure  in equation (4) by Z, where 
(7)  tz  = (1 + p)(w0 + pe) = c,. 
The discounted pension is simply the present value of the minimal wage 
structure cost under uncertainty. The value of  C, equals C, for ex post 
compensation so that pensions and ex post compensation are the cheapest 
turnover- reduction mechanisms. If there are costs to monitoring the out- 
come of the job lottery, wage structure tilting will be dominant. 
8.3.3  Heterogeneous Perceptions 
If there is  heterogeneity in workers’ risk perceptions, wage structure 
tilting will be the least costly alternative except in one instance. If all work- 
ers have biased assessments and overestimate the risk, the firm can limit 
its wage costs to C, by offering ex post compensation. This form of wage 
structure can never induce worker self-selection. 
Pensions will, however, induce self-selection. Assuming that they are 
set so as to prevent worker turnover, the only relevant parameter of  the 
prior distribution is its mean. Workers with lower mean values of the prior 
will be self- selected, and the cost of the firm’s wage structure will be given 
by equation (4),  where p corresponds to the assessed initial risk for the 
low-risk group. Although for this group there will be no turnover, there is 
no assurance that all turnover will be eliminated. Some workers with higher 
values of p but with very imprecise initial judgments may be attracted to 
the job and may then quit if the first-period outcome is unsuccessful. 
Consider two groups of workers, which I will designate type 1 and type 
2, where the respective prior probabilities of an adverse outcome are pl 
and p2,  where pl < p2.  For prior probability assessments from the beta 
family, if the precision yl 5  y2, even pensions with minimal tilting (eqs. 
[5] and [6])  will screen out higher-risk group 2 workers. If however, y2  < 
yl,  it may be that the group with the higher probability pi of an adverse 
outcome may find it desirable to start the job, quit after an unfavorable 
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To show that this is the case, it suffices to construct a numerical exam- 
ple. Let yl = 100 andp = .5, and substitute these values into equations (5) 
and (6),  yielding terms I will designate WQ!  and ZQ!. Worker 2 has beliefs 
characterized by y2  = 1 and 132  = .5 1. Let the discount factor /3  be one. 
Whereas a w + z value equal to wo  + .510 is sufficient to  prevent turnover 
of worker 1 in period 2 after an adverse outcome, this value must be at 
least wo  + .758 to prevent worker 2 from quitting since his looser prior is 
updated more after the adverse initial job experience. Below I will assume 
that the pension tilting is set at the minimal level needed to retain worker 
1, which in turn will lead worker 2 to quit after an unfavorable period  1 
outcome. 
Worker 2 will, however, find the job attractive in the initial period if 
W, -  p2e + pzw0 + (1 -  p2)[w, + Za -  p2(0,  1)ei > 2w0. 
Since the terms on the left-hand side of the equation simplify to 2w0  + 
.lo, he will accept the uncertain job and will not be screened out. 
Pensions Zthat involve maximum upward tilting (i.e., all wages are paid 
in period 2) are more likely to serve as a complete self-selection device 
since any worker who leaves after an adverse outcome will have a chance 
1 -  p2  of receiving no wage payment. Moreover, concentrating the entire 
wage in the second period makes it more likely that the worker will stay in 
period 2 following an adverse outcome, in which case only the mean pi  of 
the prior is relevant. 
Letting Z denote the maximum wage structure tilting package that is re- 
quired to attract and retain the low-risk type 1 worker, we have the result 
that the type 2 worker will remain on the job after an adverse outcome if z 
-  pz( 1,O)O  1  WO,  or, on  substitution for z from equation  (7) and rearrang- 
ing terms, wo  1  8[/3p2(  1,O) -  p,]. The maximum pension always prevents 
turnover if wo  exceeds the terms on the right-hand side of this inequality. 
Unless p~(1,  0) exceeds pI,  and either this gap is very large or 8 is suffi- 
ciently large, pensions can always prevent turnover. Once this condition is 
met, the type 2 worker will necessarily be screened out since the attractive- 
ness of a wage structure involving no turnover hinges solely on the initial 
risk assessment, andp, > pI.  Although pensions do  not always act as per- 
fect self-selection devices, increasing the upward tilt of the wage structure 
enhances their effectiveness as a self-selection mechanism. 
When  there  are legitimate differences in  worker  riskiness, this  risk- 
selection property is attractive because it reduces wage costs by matching 
low-risk workers to the job. With biased perceptions, there will be cost 
savings for the firm but less favorable implications for worker welfare. As 
in section 8.2, the cost of ex post compensation will be based on the aver- 
age riskiness of workers attracted and will be more expensive than wage 
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8.3.4  Wage Structures That Permit Turnover 
If the wage structure permits worker turnover to occur, the choice is 
narrowed  to flat wages  and period-by-period  wage  payments.  Ex post 
compensation never enters since any time- invariant compensation system 
of this type will necessarily prevent turnover in both periods unless the 
employer fires all workers with adverse initial job experiences. 
Unlike the case in which the wage structure must always prevent turn- 
over, the flat wage structure will be successful in attracting workers and 
keeping them following a success but not after a failure in the first period. 
Since workers with favorable job experiences update their priors top(0,l) 
< p,  any flat wage that attracts the worker to the firm initially will over- 
pay him in later periods. 
The minimal flat wage wf  that will attract the worker to the firm must 
meet the condition that 
wf  -  pe + ppw0 + ~(1  -  p)[wf  -  ~(0,  1)ei = w0  + pw0, 
or, solving for wf, 
sincep(0, 1) < p.  With learning, the firm lowers its wage costs per period 
worked by only retaining those workers with favorable experiences. One 
can also show that Sw,/sy  > 0, or the value of this wage increases with the 
precision of the prior. 
The pension option must meet three requirements. First, the pension 
must not retain the worker in period 2 after an adverse outcome, or w + z 
-  p(1,O)O < wo;  otherwise the wage structure reduces to  a situation treat- 
ed in section 8.3.2. Second, the wage structure must retain the worker fol- 
lowing a favorable outcome, or w + z -  p(0, 1) L WO.  And, finally, the 
worker must accept the job initially, or 
w -  pe + Ppwo + P(1 -  p)[w + z  -  p(0, 111  = wo + Pwo. 
The minimal pension z  can be negative since it is easier to retain the work- 
er after a success than to attract him initially. 
A fundamental concern is how individuals’ probability assessments re- 
late to the properties of the wage structure. In particular, for what combi- 
nations of precision y  and initial risk assessments p will the worker never 
start the job, accept the job and quit after an adverse experience, or never 
leave the position? I will present these requirements for pensions which, 
depending on the degree of tilting, will include all possible temporal wage 
structures. 
The requirement that the worker just be indifferent between remaining 
on the job after an  adverse outcome or quitting can be written as 234  W.  Kip Viscusi 
G = w + z -  p(i, ole -  w0 = 0. 
The combination of acceptable (y, p)  values that satisfy this requirement 
is positively related since 
or the highest y  value that is acceptable is positively related to the initial 
riskp. Similarly, the worker will be indifferent to starting the job initially 
if 
H = w -  pe  + ppw0 + p(i -  P)[W + z - ype]  -  w0  -  pw0 = 0, 
Y+l 
where one can show that 
As the assessed initial risk rises, the worker requires that his prior be less 
precise if he is to  accept the job initially. 
Figure 8.1  sketches the three possibilities.12 For very  high risks, the 
worker never starts the job. Tighter probabilities lower the value of  the 
highest acceptable initial risk since the worker updates tight priors less, 
thus reducing the potential value of the job after a success. The precision 
of the prior has the opposite effect for preventing workers from ever leav- 
ing. Higher values ofp  will be accepted for tighter priors since these priors 
Precision y 
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are not updated as much after an adverse outcome, making it easier to re- 
tain the worker. In the intermediate (y, p)  range, the worker accepts the 
job initially and quits after an adverse outcome. The probability range 
satisfying this condition is greatest for low values of y. In the limiting 
case, as y -  co ,  this middle range disappears; the worker simply has a cut- 
off probability above which he will not start the job and below which he 
will never leave it. 
This diagram can also be applied to the issue of self-selection. Although 
pensions that attract workers but do not keep them may screen out some 
high-risk workers, pensions will not always serve as a perfect self-selection 
device. As the top curve in figure 8.1 suggests, workers with higher as- 
sessed risks may find the job acceptable if the precision y of their priors is 
sufficiently low. For workers with very high values of p, however, tilting 
the wage structure will screen them out. 
The role of the precision of workers’ priors is closely related to that of 
the variability of the risk, although the implications are quite different. If 
a worker were in a job situation that he would never leave, the only matter 
of consequence would be the mean risk. It would not matter, for example, 
if he faced a chance .5 of an adverse outcome or an equal probability that 
the underlying lottery poses a risk .4 or a risk .6. Even though he risks in- 
curring an unfavorable lottery with p equal to .4 for every period of his 
work career, so long as there is no worker turnover the situations are iden- 
tical. 
For situations involving turnover, the variability is of substantial conse- 
quence. Workers prefer loose priors because they create possible employ- 
ment paths on which they can quit if  the information is unfavorable and 
remain if  the information is favorable. Since the compensation package 
makes the worker indifferent between the uncertain job and alternative 
employment, variations in p have no effect overall on expected utility. A 
related issue that does have nontrivial implications is whether for  a given 
compensation structure and for  particular employment paths, variability 
inp  raises or lowers the worker’s expected utility. 
The worker’s expected utility in a situation where he finds the job ac- 
ceptable but quits after an adverse outcome is given by 
EU = w -  pe + ppw0 + p(i -  P)[W  + z -  Lei. 
Y+l 
Raising the assessed risk lowers worker welfare, as expected, since 
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These results imply that the worker’s expected utility for this employ- 
ment path is convex inp  and takes the form sketched in figure 8.2. TheEU 
curve lies below the dotted line representing linear combinations of the ex- 
pected utility when there is no chance of  an accident (the vertical inter- 
cept) and the expected utility when an accident is certain. From Jensen’s 
inequality we have the result that the worker would prefer a lottery on the 
extreme certainty situations (with a chancep of the unfavorable outcome) 
to a situation in which he faces the same lottery in each period with the 
riskp of an adverse outcome. 
It would be preferable from the worker’s point of view to have an equal 
chance of facing a risk  .4 or .6 for both periods, as opposed to a lottery 
with a risk of  .5. The attractiveness of this lottery on extremes increases as 
one increases the probability spread, where the highest-ranking situation 
is that in which there is a 5050 chance of suffering a loss or being free of 
this loss throughout the employment path. For given employment paths 
and wage structures, workers prefer greater risk in the sense of a mean 
preserving spread on the job lottery probabilities.”  The preferability of 
such a lottery on extreme certain situations parallels the earlier result in 
which workers display a preference for uncertain situations (i.e., low y 
values, since as y -  0 the mass of the probability density functions is con- 
centrated around the values zero and one). 
For the situation in which turnover may occur, it is instructive to ascer- 
tain whether the employer will be indifferent to the degree of  wage struc- 
EU 
i 
Risk  p 
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ture tilting. The range of w + z values consistent with keeping the worker 
in period 2 only after a success must satisfy 
(8) 
(9) 
w + z -  p(i,  o)e c w0 5  w + z -  p(o,  110. 
w + z = w0 + p(o, i)e + S, 
For concreteness, let 
where the parameter swill be successively increased to assess the desirabil- 
ity of affecting the steepness of the earnings profile through greater reli- 
ance on pensions. The base period wage w  required to attract the worker 
will be 
(10)  w = wo + pe -  p(i -  p)~. 
Suppose the firm’s assessment of the risk of an adverse outcome is q. 
With this wage structure, it estimates that the discounted expected wage 
costs over the employment path C,  will be 
which on substitution for w  simplifies to 
c, = w0  + pe + ~(1  -  qw0  + P(O,  1)ei + P(P -  4)s. 
The fundamental concern is how the firm’s costs are affected by the de- 
gree of tilting. If workers overestimate the risk (i.e., p  > q), C,  is mini- 
mized by setting s equal to zero; the earnings profile will be downward 
sloping or the pension z is negative. Moreover, if the degree of overestima- 
tion is sufficiently great, the employer can limit the per period wage costs 
to wo  + q0  by offering ex post compensation. If p equals q, the firm is in- 
different to the degree of tilting in the experience-earnings profile. Finally, 
if workers underassess the risk, the firm will set the value of s at its maxi- 
mum value consistent with the requirements of equations (9) and (lo), 
thus placing great reliance on pensions as a compensation investment. 
The role of pensions in the presence of misperceptions is consequently 
to enable employers to reduce their wage costs by exploiting underesti- 
mates of the risk. Since workers with low values ofp  (and low y) will tend 
to be self-selected into the job, there will  be a tendency to attract such 
workers to the job. If workers underassess the risk andp < q,  the optimal 
second-period wage for the case permitting turnover will be wo  + p(  1,O)e 
-  E, where E is some arbitrarily small amount. 
The issue then becomes whether the employer should raise the second- 
period wage by  E  and prevent turnover altogether. This will generally not 
be the case since one can show that the condition that per period wage 
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reduces to  the requirement q I  1. In the presence of pensions and misper- 
ceptions, the per period wage bill is always reduced by attracting workers 
who underestimate the risk and then permitting them to leave. 
In effect, the firm is engaging in an unfair bet against the worker. The 
worker is shifting resources from period 1 to period 2 in the hopes that he 
will  have a  favorable job outcome and collect the pension.  The firm 
makes money from these bets because workers do not collect the pension 
with as high a probability as they assessed; or, viewed somewhat different- 
ly, they shift their earnings forward in time on an actuarially unfair basis. 
8.3.5  Streaks, Misperceptions, and Worker Welfare 
If  the worker is engaged not in a two-period problem but in a multi- 
period  problem,  the  difficulties caused by  misperceptions  will  be  en- 
hanced. In the extreme case, the worker must have a string of n favorable 
outcomes in n periods in order to collect his pension (e.g.,  the risk of 
death). In this situation, the discounted expected pension benefit is p”  -  z 
E(1  -  p)“.  Since biases in the assessed risk have a multiplicative effect, 
there may be severe losses in worker welfare and, as before, there will be 
an incentive for the employer to exploit these biases. 
This outcome is of policy concern for several reasons. First, workers 
are gambling with resources for a heavily subsidized portion of  their life 
cycle. If the pension system is not effective, the burden on publicly funded 
programs  will  be  increased.  Second,  workers  may  be  matched  ineffi- 
ciently to jobs. Third, ex post, workers will be unhappy with the outcome. 
This dissatisfaction by itself is not compelling since workers will always be 
unhappy after an unfavorable lottery outcome unless there is full contin- 
gent compensation.  What distinguishes this situation is that ex ante the 
lottery might not have been attractive based on the true risks. 
Finally, employers’ discretion over the wage structure enables them to 
exploit these misperceptions.  If  ex  post  compensation  is feasible, any 
losses arising from all workers systematically overestimating the risk can 
be prevented. If at least some workers underestimate the risk, any such 
losses can be prevented (irrespective of  y) by  designing a self-selecting 
wage structure to exploit the misperceptions. 
8.4  Alternative Lottery Structures 
Even with the introduction of worker learning, the format in which in- 
dividuals face uncertainties  generated by  a Bernoulli process does not 
reflect the nature of all job lotteries. For example, an individual may dis- 
cover whether or not he will be successful in a particular line of work dur- 
ing the initial period.  If  he incurs an initial lottery on 0 and will suffer 
whatever loss (possibly zero) he experiences in the first period throughout 
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the model in section 8.3 once we let y -  0. If, however, there is no such 
initial loss but the worker learns about his future prospects, the structure 
of the model is somewhat different. This situation is the focus of  section 
8.4.2. 
Some outcomes, such as the arrival of an outside job offer or the chance 
of promotion, may occur with some probabilityp in each period, but once 
they have occurred they affect the rewards structure in all subsequent peri- 
ods. A variation on this structure allows for the possibility that the size of 
the reward may vary as, for example, the attractiveness of  the job may 
continually deteriorate or the worker may be promoted to increasingly 
higher positions. These situations will be addressed in sections 8.4.2 and 
8.4.3. 
Although this group of lottery structures is not exhaustive, it does span 
a rather broad spectrum of labor market possibilities. A principal purpose 
of this comprehensive coverage is to ascertain whether the desirability of 
upward-tilting wage structures, such as those induced by pensions, is a 
specific Lharacteristic of situations with learning or whether, to take the 
opposite extreme, the optimality of flat wages pertains only to a very spe- 
cial type of uncertainty. 
8.4.1  A Single Lottery 
Suppose that the worker faces a single lottery in the initial period that 
will affect his rewards at the firm in all subsequent periods. He may dis- 
cover whether or not he will like a particular line of work or be successful 
at it. There is some probabilityp that he will suffer a loss -  8 in all subse- 
quent periods and a chance 1 -  p of no such loss. The lottery does not af- 
fect rewards in the initial period. To distinguish the payoff structure of 
pensions from that of ex post compensation, I will assume that there are 
three periods to  the choice problem. 
If the firm wished to  retain only the low-cost workers with favorable ex- 
periences, the solution would be simple; it would simply offer a flat wage 
wo.  To give other wage structures a possible role, I will assume that tur- 
nover costs are sufficiently high that the firm wishes to keep workers with 
unfavorable experiences as well. It will, however, wish to hold down its 
wage costs by attracting workers with a lower riskp, a point I will return 
to below when heterogeneity is introduced. 
The firm can offer a flat wage wO  + 8, with a present value CJ of 
2 
c, = (wO  + e) C P’, 
i=O 
but it is clearly not in the firm’s interest to do so. The worker experiences 
no loss in the initial period and is consequently overpaid by 8. In periods 2 
and 3 there is a chance 1 -  p that he will be overpaid by 8 under this wage 
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Ex post compensation,if feasible, can reduce these wage costs to 
Workers’ expected and realized utility is always wo  in each period, just 
matching the value of the alternative job. 
With accurate worker perceptions,  pensions clearly cannot offer any 
improvement on this outcome, but they can offer firms the same wage 
costs without the requirement to monitor the lottery outcome. There is 
considerable leeway in the degree to which wages can be shifted forward 
in time, on an actuarially fair basis, into a pension. In the extreme case, all 
wages received could be in terms of  a pension. The minimal value of the 
pension z plus the base wage must be high enough to retain workers who 
have had unfavorable experiences. 
Rather than pursue all possible wage structures in which the wage can 
vary for each of the three periods, I will focus on the case where the firm 
pays a base wage w  in all periods and augments this wage with a pension z 
in period 3. The present value of the wage package C, is given by 
2  2 
C,  = PZ  +  p’  = (p + p2)pe  + WOE  p’. 
i=O  i=O 
The value of C, is the same as C,  so that pensions are as costly as ex post 
compensation. 
Not all wage structures satisfying equation (1  1) are  viable since this con- 
dition only ensures that the worker accepts the job. The temporal struc- 
ture of the payments must be tilted toward the latter periods or else the 
worker will quit after an unfavorable outcome after having been overpaid 
initially. To prevent turnover in the final period, 
(12)  w + z 2 wo + e, 
and to prevent turnover after the first period when the lottery outcome be- 
comes known the wage structure must satisfy 
(13)  w + p(w + Z) 2  (w0  + e)(i + 0). 
On dividing by 1 + p, this condition is 
Since @/(1  + 6) is less than one, the second-period constraint in equation 
(14) is more stringent than the third-period requirement.  Viewed some- 
what differently, a firm cannot seek to retain workers with adverse experi- 
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ture that will retain them in the earlier period will do so in the final period 
as well. 
In effect, the firm must pay a wage package in the final two periods with 
a discounted per period value of  wo  + 0 or else turnover will result. Since 
the expected loss in each of these periods is onlype at the time the job is 
accepted, workers are overpaid on an expected basis in the final periods 
and consequently can be underpaid initially. Rearranging equation (14) 
gives the form for the minimal pension as 
Substituting this value for z into equation (10) and solving for w  produces 
the result that w = wo + (0 + @’)S@  - 1). The worker takes a wage cut 
below his reservation wage in the first two periods and is compensated 
through his pension for both his expected loss and his initial underpay- 
ment.  The worker must be overcompensated when viewed from the ex 
ante situation since his turnover choice is based on the actual lottery out- 
come, while his initial job acceptance decision is based on his expected 
prospects. The optimal wage structure is increasing over the worker’s ten- 
ure with the firm. Finally, with only a single lottery, the worker is indiffer- 
ent to the variations in the risk for any given mean initial risk level. 
Unlike ex  post  compensation,  pensions will  serve as a perfect  self- 
selection device. Even if workers’ probability assessmentsp are subjective 
and potentially affected by learning, since there is only a single lottery be- 
ing incurred,  only the initial risk  assessment is  relevant.  With a wage 
structure satisfying equation (1 l),  those with risk assessments not exceed- 
ingp will find the job acceptable, while those with higher risk assessments 
will avoid the job. If the differences in risk perceptions arise from under- 
lying heterogeneity in the risk, the efficiency of labor market matches will 
be enhanced by pensions, whereas with biased perceptions pensions serve 
primarily as a profit-making device. Since the situation being considered 
is that in which all workers remain at the firm, the gain from offering the 
pension does not arise because workers do not collect it. Moreover, the 
minimal wage outlays in periods 2 and 3 are unaffected by the assessed 
risk because the wage package must keep all workers after the lottery has 
been resolved. The financial gains for the firm arise from being able to 
lower the base wage as the worker’s assessment of the chance of  an unfa- 
vorable outcome declines. 
When there is heterogeneity or misperception, there also will be an ad- 
vantage to offering pensions even when turnover is permitted. Although 
paying a flat wage wo  will only retain workers with favorable experiences, 
the proportion of workers with unfavorable outcomes will be higher if the 
firm does not  offer  a wage structure that self-selects only the low-risk 
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pensions will screen out workers who have a higher perceived chance of an 
unfavorable lottery outcome. 
If the wage-pension package permits turnover, then the worker who has 
an assessed risk will prefer to leave after an unfavorable outcome, or 
w -  e + P(W + z -  e) < w0  + owo. 
To simplify the subsequent analysis I will assume that 0 is so large that 
even if all compensation is through the pension (i.e.,  w = 0) the worker 
will leave after an unsuccessful outcome. As before, one can show that the 
most desirable z will be its maximum value consistent with turnover when- 
ever workers underestimate p and consequently overestimate the chance 
of collecting the pension. 
To attract a worker with risk assessmentp^to  the job, z must satisfy 
2 
(P + P’)iwo + P2(1 -  p^)z 1  WOE  p’. 
i=O 
The least costly pension is consequently 
If p represents the true risk faced by the worker, which is assumed to be 
known by the firm, the discounted expected wage costs are 
Dividing by the discounted expected periods worked, the wage bill per pe- 
riod is 
If there are misperceptions in which workers underestimate the risk, or p^ 
< p,  the wage-pension combination with turnover can lower the per peri- 
od wage cost below wo  by engaging workers in pension bets at unfavorable 
odds. Without misperception, p  = d,  and there is no wage gain, but there 
is a reduction in the proportion of workers who quit because of adverse 
lottery outcomes. 
8.4.2  Binary Failure Processes 
A somewhat more complicated lottery structure is a binary failure pro- 
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come there is a chance p of a loss -  6 in each period. As in the model in 
section 8.4.1,  once this loss is incurred, the worker will suffer it in each of 
the remaining periods as well should he decide to remain with the firm. 
These assumptions best characterize situations in which a worker discov- 
ers that his job will be unpleasant, or he will be unproductive and conse- 
quently never promoted. Since 0 also can be treated as altering the relative 
rewards of the job, one can view this situation as one in which the worker 
gets a permanent outside job offer. Instead of having a reservation wage 
WO,  he has a required wage wo  + 0 for the remainder of his work career. 
For job lotteries of this type, it suffices to consider the implications in a 
two-period model. The flat wage option continues to impose as low costs 
as any alternative approach  if  worker turnover is  permitted  and if  all 
workers assess the risk asp. The per period wage bill of  wo  is the same as 
the expected per period cost with pensions as well. Under pensions, how- 
ever, the firm can potentially attract the low-turnover workers if there is 
heterogeneity in the risk assessments. With either legitimate risk differ- 
ences or misperceptions, when some groups of workers have a risk assess- 
ment;  < p pensions will impose the least costs. 
As a means for preventing worker turnover, the flat wage is dominated 
since the wage must be  wo  + 0 to achieve this result,  leading to over- 
payment of  all workers who, in each period, do not have adverse job 
experiences. Contingent wage payments offer a lower-cost method of pre- 
venting turnover in situations in which the lottery outcome can be moni- 
tored. The present value of the ex post compensation package is 
or 
The contingent payment just compensates the worker for his reservation 
wage plus his on-the-job losses. With homogeneous risk assessments and 
accurate perceptions, this approach imposes the same costs as pensions; if 
all workers overassess the risk, ex post compensation continues to be less 
expensive. 
Any viable pension package (w,  z)  offered by the firm must satisfy 
w0(l + p) = w -  pe + ppmax[wo, w + z -  01 
+ p(1 -  p)max [wo,  w + z -  pel  = EU.  (15) 
Any wage structure with a nonnegative pension that attracts workers ini- 
tially will retain them after a favorable first-period outcome, or 
(16) 
(17) 
W + z -  pe  2  w0. 
w + z -  e 2  w0, 
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whereas if this condition is not met, turnover occurs for all workers with 
adverse initial job experiences. 
In each turnover case, pensions meeting the conditions above will in- 
duce the self-selection of all workers with risk assessments below p. Biases 
in risk perception will, as before, make it desirable to shift income for- 
ward in time, particularly when workers overestimate the chance that they 
will collect the pension. Finally, the wage structure induced by pensions 
will always be upward sloping if pensions are designed to prevent turn- 
over. Otherwise the firm in effect is operating within the context of section 
8.2’s compensating differential model except that all workers with unfa- 
vorable experiences in period 1 drop out of the sample. 
The principal difference with the results in section 8.4.1 is the effect of 
variability in the riskp. If the compensation package is always adjusted to 
ensure that equation (15) holds, workers would be indifferent to such fluc- 
tuations. I will focus instead on workers on particular employment paths 
that will not be altered by minor variations inp, where the wage structure 
is viewed as exogenous. In this instance, the variability ofp  may be conse- 
quential. 
Consider first the situation in which  turnover  is  permitted, that  is, 
equation (1  5) holds but equation (17) does not. The effect of altering p is 
given by 
--  aEU - -e+pw,+p(i  -p)(-e)-p(w+z-pe)<o 
aP 
and 
--  a2EU -  2pe > 0. 
a@ 
As in the learning case, workers’ expected utility is convex inp. 
holds), one obtains 
Similarly, when no turnover occurs under the pension (i.e.,  eq. I171 
aEU -  -  - -e + 2peb -  1) < 0, 
aP 
and 
In each case workers’ expected utility is convex inp, as illustrated in figure 
8.2. A lottery on the extreme certainty situations will, for any given em- 
ployment path, be preferred to lotteries with intermediate probabilities. 
Unlike the model in section 8.3, no learning was included in this analy- 
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in the assessed risk but on the creation of an asymmetric lottery structure 
over time.  In the learning case, there was no such asymmetry when no 
turnover occurred and a2EU/ap2  equaled zero. Similarly, for the replicat- 
ed identical lotteries in section 8.2 and the single lottery of  section 8.4.1, 
the fact that whatever lottery was incurred never changed produced the re- 
sult that workers were indifferent among all lotteries with the same iaitial 
risk level. 
8.4.3  Deterioration Processes 
These results must be altered somewhat if the job lotteries do not pose 
simply a chance of losing 8 but a more general risk in which the attractive- 
ness of the job may steadily deteriorate. Either the attractiveness of  the 
job itself may steadily decline or the job alternative may become increas- 
ingly attractive. If the worker receives outside offers with the option of re- 
call, his reservation wage may rise to wo  + d,  then to wo  + 8’ ,  where 8’ > 
0. For concreteness, I will treat the lottery in terms of a loss 8 on one’s 
present job, where this loss occurs with probabilityp. Once the initial loss 
0 has been incurred, the worker faces a chancep’ that the loss will rise to 
8‘.  Althoughp’ need not equalp, this posibility is not ruled out. 
Many of the results for this lottery structure follow a familiar pattern. 
In the two-period case, the flat wage that prevents turnover costs C, = (1 
+ p)(wo + O’), which overpays all workers over the course of employ- 
ment since it matches their highest reservation wage. Contingent compen- 
sation continues to be the least costly solution when risk perceptions are 
accurate, where 
c, = w0(i + p) + pe + ppp‘e’  + ,mi -  p’)e + ~(1  -  pipe. 
Pensions can attract and retain workers at the same cost and, if there is 
heterogeneity  in  workers’  risk  assessments,  they  will  serve as a self- 
selection device, whereas contingent compensation will  not.  Moreover, 
with heterogeneity or biased perceptions in which the risk is underestimat- 
ed, pensions continue to impose fewer costs. 
The role of the variability of the risk is somewhat different, however. 
Consider first the situation in which pensions prevent worker turnover. 
The present value of the pension pay package is 
c, = w + p(w + 2) 
= wo(i + p) + pe + pp[p’e’ + (1 -  py]  + p(i -  pipe, 
EU = w -  pe + pp[w + z -  p’e‘ -  p(i -  p’)e] 
+ p(1 -  P)(W + z -  pel. 
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Ifp  andp‘  are different, 
and 
Expected utility is convex in p,  and the worker prefers a mixture of ex- 
treme lotteries to  the lotteries with intermediate probabilities (see fig. 8.2). 
If, however, p = p’  , 
--  6Eu - -e + p[w + z -  pel -  p(i -  p)e] + pp(-el  -  e + 2pe) 
SP 
and 
62EU -  --  -2pw  + tippe. 
6P2 
Expected utility is convex inp  if 8‘ is sufficiently small relative to  8, or, 
more specifically,  if 3pO  > 8’.  For every large 8’ the EU function is bowed 
outward, and the worker prefers an intermediate lottery to a mixture on 
extremes with the same expected initial risk. The reason for this reversal is 
that with extremep values the worker has a greater chance of incurring the 
successive losses 8 and 8’. 
For very large 8‘ the firm will not find it attractive to retain the worker 
unless turnover costs are very high. In instances in which turnover occurs, 
the discounted expected pension cost is 
c,  = w + p(i -  P)(W + 2) = w,, + pe + p(i -  p)(w0 + pel. 
EU = w -  pe  + ppwo + p(i -  p)(w + z -  pel, 
The worker’s expected utility is given by 
which is the same as in the binary failure case in section 8.4.2. In this situa- 
tion EU is convex inp. 
8.5  Conclusion 
The only job lottery situation in which pensions do not play a useful 
role is  the standard compensating differential model in which workers 
face an identical sequence of lotteries over time and never leave the job 
after starting it. In all other situations, pensions and other forms of rising 
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risk-neutral workers as does ex post compensation. Moreover, unlike con- 
tingent compensation, there is no need to monitor the lottery outcome. 
If workers have heterogeneous risk perceptions, pensions offer an addi- 
tional advantage even in situations in which turnover is not a matter of 
concern. By  self-selecting the workers with low risk assessments and, in 
the biased perceptions case, by enabling the firm to  make unfair bets with 
workers, pensions reduce firms’ wage costs. 
The welfare  implications  and the efficiency of the job matches will, 
however, be quite different depending on the source of the heterogeneity. 
If  some workers underestimate the risk, pensions will create incentives 
that will lead to the self-selection of workers into the job. Workers may 
then be trapped inefficiently based on the true risks, and those workers 
who leave will forfeit their pension benefits. 
The fact that pensions trap some workers in jobs they would like to 
leave does not in itself suggest that workers entered jobs with biased per- 
ceptions. Even with accurate perceptions, ex post workers who have expe- 
rienced unfavorable lottery outcomes may be on jobs they wish to leave, 
but to which their forfeitable pensions tie them. The existence of a nega- 
tive pension-turnover  relationship and dissatisfaction among immobile 
workers does not necessarily provide a rationale for mandatory vesting re- 
quirements. 
The variability of the risks faced by workers also plays a critical role. 
Except in the case of single or replicated identical lotteries and one in- 
stance of  the deterioration process, workers’ expected utility is convex in 
p.  A lottery on extreme, more stable employment paths is preferred to  the 
situation in which workers face an intermediate risk each period.  In the 
presence of learning, jobs associated with less precise priors are perferred. 
Since less precise priors make possible a wider divergence of posterior- 
assessed risks, the underlying principle involved is quite similar. 
A recurring theme in these results is that the design of the compensation 
structure in situations of uncertainty is quite sensitive to the structure of 
the uncertainty the worker encounters. Although pensions serve no pro- 
ductive function in the presence of lottery structures such as those consid- 
ered  in  the  compensating  differential  literature,  the  other  forms of 
uncertainty considered suggest that pensions have a legitimate role to play 
as a compensation instrument. Situations of learning are one such sto- 
chastic structure, but learning is by no means required for pensions to 
serve a useful function. 
In  the presence  of  uncertainty  and turnover costs,  nontransferable 
pensions can be important in self-selecting more stable employees and re- 
ducing the turnover of  workers attracted to the firm.  Unfortunately,  if 
workers have biased perceptions, pensions will be offered by employers 
even in situations in which there would be no cost reductions from pen- 
sions if workers were fully informed. The possibility of  such abuses may 
create a potential rationale for collective action. 248  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Notes 
1.  For further description of the turnover-related benefit provisions see Ellwood (in this 
volume) and Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). 
2. Three representative studies are Viscusi (1979), in which I focus on dummy variables 
for whether or not the worker was covered by a pension; Schiller and Weiss (1979), who ana- 
lyze a series of variables related to pension characteristics; and Mitchell (1982),  who uses 
pension dummy variable and a survey that was the sequel to the data set I examined. 
3.  This point was first made by Becker (1964). 
4.  See Viscusi (1983) for the results presented in terms of time-varying wage rates. Anal- 
ogous findings are presented for pensions in a preliminary form of the paper, “Specific In- 
formation,  General Information, and Employment  Matches under Uncertainty,”  NBER 
Working Paper no. 394 (1979). 
5. This analysis is presented in Lazear (1984). 
6. The forced savings argument  presupposes  that the worker  wishes to be tied to a 
“Christmas club”-type plan for old age. It may be that forced savings lead to an inefficiently 
large deferral of savings for old age. 
7. The loss need not be financial, but I will assume that it can be converted into a non- 
monetary equivalent. The uncertainty could be with regard to worker productivity, which in 
turn affects output. This case, which I consider in Viscusi (1983), yields similar results but is 
a bit more complicated to analyze. 
8.  The results in this section generalize to n periods by simply changing the range of the 
summation in the equation below and by letting the discount factor multiplying pensions z 
bep” - I. 
9.  Ex post compensation also may eliminate lotteries that serve a productive function. If 
the worker is assured of  making his piecework quota or if he is guaranteed a promotion, 
there will be less incentive for him to work hard. These concerns arise in situations in which 
employers may pay workers according to relative performance because of the difficulty in 
monitoring performance. See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), and O’Keeffe, et al. (1984). 
10.  For treatments of self-selection in somewhat different contexts, see Salop and Salop 
(1976)and Viscusi (1979). 
11.  In the n-period case, the analysis becomes quite complicated. Although the worker 
will always remain on the job after a favorable outcome on the previous trial, how soon he 
chooses to switch jobs cannot in general be ascertained. Since the value ofp(rn, n) is contin- 
ually changing, the problem is not amenable to closed-form solutions such as one encounters 
in the job search literature. The most that can be determined is that there is a quite broad 
range of turnover possibilities. 
12.  Moreover, so long as the downward tilt is not too great the worker will not leave after 
a success. Although the relative shapes generally hold, the various curves may intersect the 
horizontal axis rather than the vertical axis. In the extreme case, one might never leave the 
job for any (p.  y) combination, or one might never be willing to start the job. In these situa- 
tions, the wage structure can be redesigned to provide the desired turnover properties. 
13. This definition of increasing risk is adopted by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
Comment  Sherwin Rosen 
This  paper  discusses  how  nonvested  pensions  affect  labor mobility 
(quit) decisions of workers who are only imperfectly informed of some 
job attribute and who become better informed of it through on-the-job 
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experience. We know from previous work that the use of deferred pay bi- 
ases self-selection toward more stable workers.  Unstable  workers  find 
these jobs less attractive because they have a larger chance of losing much 
of their pay by quitting before the pension is received. Viscusi extends this 
argument in a subtle and sophisticated way to incorporate worker uncer- 
tainty on how the job matches to  workers’ prior perceptions. 
In a world where long-term contracts are not binding on workers, the 
option of quitting increases the value of  greater initial uncertainty about 
job outcomes. The reason is similar to why a stock-market  option has 
greater value when risk increases: quitting truncates the lower tail of the 
distribution and induces new workers to  gamble that a favorable outcome 
will be realized, since losses are limited. This has two effects: First, work- 
ers who are initially misinformed about conditions take the job at low 
wages in the hope that conditions turn out to  be favorable. In that case the 
pension is received.  If the outcome is unfavorable, they quit and forgo 
their pension. The firm makes money on this and takes advantage of quit- 
ters in calculating the optimal life-cycle wage policy. Second, given the 
subset of workers who do  not leave because of insufficiently unfavorable 
realizations, nonvested pensions make it more costly to quit: some work- 
ers invariably are trapped into jobs they do not like. 
The paper concentrates on self-selection constraints. These are the sup- 
ply conditions confronting the firm, given the distribution of worker prior 
perceptions and their optimal stopping rules based on experience. This is 
an interesting exercise because so little has been written on how percep- 
tions and misperceptions  affect choices. Nonetheless,  one wonders why 
the next logical step was not taken. Why not specify and analyze the maxi- 
mum problem  for the firm subject to the constraints that have been so 
thoroughly discussed? 
Such a problem would clarify the advantages to the firm of reducing 
turnover, which play very little role in the formal analysis. It would also 
introduce other interesting factors, including incentives for the firm to  af- 
fect the loss and the probability of the adverse outcome, as well as work- 
ers’ prior perceptions of them. As the paper stands, firms are totally pas- 
sive. They merely adopt a wage policy, and the onus of staying or leaving 
is put entirely on the worker. Yet as I recall the testimony surrounding the 
passage of ERISA, it was not only the complaints of the workers locked 
into large pensions or those who voluntarily quit their jobs that led to  pen- 
sion reforms. The horror stories of workers who were involuntarily termi- 
nated prior to vesting were also important considerations. 
The incentives for a firm to engage in such behavior are clear enough. 
Any backloaded pension-wage contract involves an element of bonding 
by the worker.  The worker effectively lends money to the firm, because 
the first-period wage is less than the opportunity cost. The worker gets the 
bond back, plus interest, only if he stays long enough to collect it. The 
firm gains, myopically to be sure, by reneging in the second period and 250  W.  Kip Viscusi 
terminating the worker prior to receipt of the pension, similar to default 
on a loan. No doubt cheating of this sort is limited by longer-run consider- 
ations, such as loss of reputation. Nonetheless, marginal analysis suggests 
that a little cheating will  persist in equilibrium.  For example, in those 
cases involving close calls about probable cause of termination, the prob- 
ability of the firm’s committing type I1 error in discharges is increased. 
One wonders how  a more complete treatment  of  this problem  would 
change the positive and normative nature of the results and suggest alter- 
native reforms. 
One hopes in subsequent work that more attention will be paid to the 
empirical predictions of  the model. What does the model say about the 
circumstances under which nonvested pensions will be an important con- 
sideration? When will they be observed? In fact, as it stands, wage vari- 
ations in a multiperiod model could easily perform the same self-selection 
role as pensions do. It is the wage gradient that is important to the model, 
not pensions per se, because there are no end period unraveling conun- 
drums in this problem. Be that as it may, the interest of the work would be 
considerably enhanced if  it were related to some conceivable data. Per- 
haps a good place to start thinking about these problems concretely is in 
the military, where nonvesting is complete up to 20 years of service. In this 
instance, pensions not only save resources by avoiding retraining through 
retention of  skilled personnel,  they also assist in solving an important 
principal-agent problem. The threat of getting cashiered and losing one’s 
pension makes enlistees better  soldiers.  Surely considerations  such as 
these are relevant to all organizations. 
Finally, the paper restricts self-selection schemes to virtually one pa- 
rameter, namely, the gap between the first- and second-period wage. Yet 
selection occurs over two parameters: the prior probability and its preci- 
sion. One suspects that two instruments-the  gap plus something else- 
would be necessary to sort people in a more efficient manner. This is com- 
plicated by the fact that initially homogeneous workers become heteroge- 
neous through differential experience. I have not been creative enough to 
identify precisely what that second instrument might be, though the risk-is- 
good argument suggests that randomization schemes and lotteries might 
be useful candidates to consider. 
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